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Abstract 
"Koninklijke  Ahold  nv"  (Royal  Dutch  Ahold)  was  the  leading 
food  retailer  in  The  Netherlands  in  1990  with  an  approximately  36% 
share  of the  food  and  grocery  market.  Moreover,  its  four  U.  S. 
companies  (Giant Food Stores, PA.; Bi-Lo, NC.;  Finast,  OR.;  and  Tops 
Friendly  Markets,  NY)  ranked  it number  ten  among  the  largest  U.  S. 
food  retailers.  Despite  this  dominance  and  obvious  knowledge  of 
food  wholesale  and  retail  distribution,  Ahold  had  historically  been 
unable  to  capture  a  satisfactory  share  of  the  fresh  food  business  in 
The  Netherlands.  Yet  this  business  represented  approximately  $7 
billion  in  current  business  and,  perhaps  more  importantly,  was 
thought  by  many  to  hold  the  key  to  future  success  in  the  food 
industry. 
The  case  study  documents  the  set  of  circumstances  that  led 
Ahold  to  experiment  with  a  new  food  store  format  that,  its 
management  hoped,  would  allow  a  more  effective  penetration  of  the 
fresh  food  business.  A  project  director  is  appointed  with  the 
assignment  to  build  a  new  fresh  foods  business.  The  case  describes 
his  initial  actions  and  presents  the  rather  disappointing  results  after 
the  store  had  been  opened  nine  months.  Part  '~A"  of  the  case  ends 
with  an  outline  of  the  areas  that  the  project  director  feels  merit 
strategic  redirection  in  order  to  achieve  more  acceptable 
performance. 
Part  "B"  of  the  case  summarizes  the  actions  incorporated  into  a 
new  strategic  marketing  plan  in  hopes  to  salvage  the  project.  New 
financial  results,  nine  months  after  the  repositioning,  are  presented. The  Fresh  Company 
Usage  Note 
This  case  is  divided  into  two  parts,  "A"  and  "B."  Accompanying 
each  part  is  a  "Teaching  Note"  to  assist  in  understanding  the  actions 
taken  by  The  Fresh  Company's  management  as  well  as  to  provide 
further  information  on  the  actual  outcome  of  the  various  strategies 
implemen ted. 
The  case  may  be  of use  in  several  ways.  First,  read  by  itself,  it 
accurately  describes  the  actual  set  of  circumstances  surrounding  the 
creation  of  a  major  new  area  of endeavor  for  one  of  the  world's 
largest  food  distributors.  As  such  it  imparts  valuable  insights 
regarding  the  internal  firm  decision  processes  and  the  strategic 
options  available  to  a  major  food  company.  Perhaps  the  more 
valuable  use  of the  case,  however,  is  as  a  teaching  vehicle. 
The  case  has  been  employed  very  effectively  both  with 
executive  groups  as  well  as  with  students.  Part  "A"  may  be  used 
alone  but,  if time  permits,  both  "A"  and  "B"  together  result  in  a  much 
better  understanding  of  the  consequences  of  the  various  strategic 
options.  Working  either  as  individuals  or  in  groups,  students  can  be 
asked  to  prepare  reports  regarding  what  they  recommend  as  the 
appropriate  strategic  steps,  what  data  are  needed,  what  errors  Ahold 
has  made  and  what  further  opportunities  lie  ahead. 
Of course,  before  distributing  the  case  to  students,  Part  "B"  and 
the  "Teaching  Notes"  should  be  detached  to  be  distributed  later 
according  to  the  style  of  the  instructor.  Anyone  with  questions  about 
usage  is  encouraged  to  contact  me  at  Cornell  University,  (607)  255-
3169. '. 
If 
The Fresh Company 
Anton Innemee frowned as he put down his notes on the challenges 
currently confronting The Fresh Company.  He had just finished sketching 
out these thoughts in response to the troublesome reports delivered from 
Albert Heijn's Management Information Department (MID) and a  meeting 
with the new company president.  The reports, The Fresh Company's 
operating results for the first six months of 1989, confirmed what Mr. 
Innemee and his management team suspected:  performance was far 
below original projections.  Mr. Innemee, Director of The Fresh Company, 
had been recruited to join the Albert Heijn Supermarket Company only 20 
months earlier to lead its proposed new initiative in fresh foods marketing. 
The initiative was later named "The Fresh Company."  Mr. Innemee was 
aware of the severity of the dilemma that the reports posed:  find ways to 
turn the Company around or discontinue the fresh foods program. 
Food Shopping in  Europe and Holland 
Once upon a time, food shopping in Europe consisted of the frequent, 
often daily, trip to the local speciality food store.  Indeed, European food lore 
is inextricably intertwined with the image of the quaint neighborhood shop 
with its amiable and knowledgeable merchant, skilled in his craft.  In this 
era, when consumers wanted bread, they went to the baker.  When they 
wanted milk, they went to the creamery.  When they wanted meat, they 
went to the beef (or horse) butcher.  And so it was with fish, pastry, wine, 
and fresh fruits and vegetables.  After several stops, which generally 
included a ritual handshake with the shopkeeper followed by an exchange 
of complaints about one's liver problems and other aliments, the shopper 
had the ingredients for the evening meal.  However, this image was no 
longer necessarily consistent with the radical ways in which consumer 
change across Europe was remolding lifestyles and shopping patterns in 
the latter part of the 1980s. 
********************************************************************* 
©  This case study was prepared by Professor Edward W.  McLaughlin, Cornell 
University, as a basis for classroom discussion rather than to illustrate either the effective 
or ineffective handling of a  managerial  situation. • 
Demographic and consequent lifestyle trends, in particular, were 
having their predictable impacts.  Increasing numbers of two income 
households and women working outside the home were global trends that 
were having a profound influence on the nature of all types of retailing, and 
especially, food shopping.  "One-Stop Shopping" had become the passwords. 
In The Netherlands, the trends were very similar to other European 
countries.  Population growth, household size, female labor force 
participation, and real expenditures on consumer goods are just a few of 
the demographic trends that had changed, in some cases dramatically, in 
the past few years and were forecast to continue to do so (Exhibits 1, 2 & 3). 
Although the Dutch female participation rate in the labor force is one of the 
lowest among the industrialized nations, it too had grown markedly in 
recent years (Exhibit 4.) 
Napoleon described England as a "nation of shopkeepers," but until 
recently, the description seemed much more appropriate to describe 
continental Europe.  Indeed, still in 1990, in spite of rampant consumer 
change, the local food boutique in Europe evoked images of fresh and 
delicious food often accompanied by a certain support of the local 
businessman.  This latter sentiment was, according to some, undeniably 
important to ensure the ambiance and preserve the quality of life, 
particularly in smaller towns. 
However, current reality was beginning to belie the traditional 
images.  The erstwhile backbone of the European food distribution system--
the complex network of specialty shops-- was now taking a rear seat to the 
contemporary supermarket.  France, for example, once regarded as the 
high temple of food worship, and this almost exclusively in small shops, 
was now selling the majority of all its food in supermarkets.  In 1988, for 
the first time, the French bought more than half of their foodstuffs (51.4%) 
at supermarkets and the even larger hypermarkets (stores with more than 
5,000 square meters of sales area) rather than at the traditional small 
shops.  In Holland, the situation was similar:  Beginning in 1987, 
consumers bought more of their overall food needs in the supermarket than 
all other sources combined (Exhibit 5.)  Specialty stores of all types were 
closing in favor of the larger supermarkets (Exhibit 6.) 
Reasons most commonly cited by industry experts to explain this 
phenomenon, were the increasing consumer demands for convenience and 
variety coupled with the low prices that often could be simultaneously 
satisfied in the massive format of modern supermarkets.  Indeed, a recent 
controversial consultant's report predicted that, following the U.S. model, 
European supermarkets would have succeeded in pushing specialty stores 
to near extinction by the year 2000. 
The growing dominance of supermarkets across Europe was 
certainly good news for companies like Albert Heijn, yet major stumbling 
2 blocks remained in the way of continued growth.  Despite consumer need 
and growing preference for one-stop shopping, national laws, local 
ordinances, and real estate scarcity combined to constrain store expansion. 
Furthermore, in The Netherlands, although one of the most densely 
populated countries in the industrialized world (Exhibit 7), the food store 
density was one of the lowest (Exhibit 8.)  Under these conditions, many of 
the often used retailer strategies for gaining an advantage on competition 
were apparently foreclosed. 
Ahold: Background and Marl{et Position 
Ahold, the name adopted in 1973, was founded in 1887 by Albert Heijn 
with one small grocery shop.  Over the following years, many additional 
stores were added.  Thirty years later the number had grown to 30 stores, 
and by 1950 there were 198 outlets;  the first self-service store opened in 1952 
and the first supermarket appeared in 1955.  The supermarkets operated 
under the trade name of the founder, "Albert Heijn."  Moreover, along the 
way a number of food manufacturing facilities were built or acquired, such 
as a coffee roaster, a central bakery, a dairy plant, a wine distillery, a meat 
fabrication facility and a  considerable number of wholesale warehouses. 
During the 1970s the firm began to diversify into other retailing formats 
such as liquor stores (Alberto), beauty shops (Etos) as well as several other 
non-retailing activities:  restaurants (AC Restaurants), vacation parks 
(Ostara) and specialized "border" food stores (Ter Huurne).  On the 
occasion of its 100th anniversary celebration, in 1987, Ahold received the 
right to call itself "Koninklijke Ahold nv" (Royal Dutch Ahold.) 
Between 1977 and 1988, Ahold expanded its food retailing frontiers 
significantly with the acquisition of three supermarket companies in the 
United States:  BI-LO (1977) a 165 store chain in the Carolinas, Giant Food 
Stores (1978) a 49 store chain in Pennsylvania, and First National 
Supermarkets (1988) a 115 store chain in Ohio, New York and New 
England.  By 1988, Ahold ranked as one of the ten top supermarket 
operators in the U. S with 1988 sales of $3.5 billion (Exhibit 9.) 
At the end of the decade of the 1980s, Ahold performance was marked 
by significant growth and expansion, as investments in existing and new 
companies reached record levels.  Between 1987 and 1988 alone consolidated 
sales rose from Dfl 11.7 billion (Dutch guilders: 2 Dfl = approximately 1 U.S. 
$) to Dfl 15.3 billion, representing a 30.7 % increase.  Consolidated net 
earnings for the same year rose by 11.0 % to Dfl 146 million (Exhibit 10.) 
Ahold held the largest market share of any retailer in The Netherlands 
(Exhibit 11) , and was increasing its lead each year at the expense of its 
competitors.  In late 1986, Ahold ranked number 12 among the largest 
distributors, food and non-food, in Europe (Exhibit 12.)  By the end of 1988, 
3 Ahold employed 78,000 people (49,520 full time equivalents) and operated 
over 1100 retail outlets in The Netherlands and the United States (Exhibit 
13.) 
The management at Ahold recognized that the success of the 
company throughout the years had been based on an ability to respond 
quickly to the often rapidly changing demands of its consumers.  Indeed, 
Mr. Albert Heijn , grandson of the founder, Ahold's president until 1989, 
had always insisted on a  strong customer-focus.  It was primarily this 
management philosophy that led the Albert Heijn Co. to its commitment to 
continuous research and monitoring of consumer trends.  A devoted 
follower of this research, Mr. Heijn, by the latter half of the 1980s,  believed 
that the ground swell of consumer interest in health, nutrition and fitness 
could no longer be ignored.  After 45 years in the food retailing business, his 
business sense told him that these consumer changes were profound and 
were likely to mean an opportunity for food merchants, most probably in the 
fresh foods area.  These were the circumstances, late in1987,  that 
prornpted Mr. Heijn to appoint Jan van Oostveen, Senior Vice-President of 
Strategic Planning at Albert Heijn, B.V. to explore how best to respond to 
the growing consumer interest in health, nutrition, fitness and their 
probable relation to fresh food sales. 
The Fresh Company 
Mr. ·van Oostveen took on the project challenge with great vigor.  Like 
Mr. Heijn, he too had been long convinced that, as the largest food company 
in The Netherlands, Ahold, and its Albert Heijn supermarket division, 
possessed the expertise needed to take advantage of the vast opportunity he 
saw in fresh food.  He was puzzled, however, that although the 
supermarkets were gaining acceptance with Dutch consumers, shoppers 
were often still reluctant to purchase their fresh foods under the same roof 
with their dry groceries.  They still were devoted patrons of the specialty 
food shops for their fresh food needs.  Consumers complained of what they 
perceived as the lower quality of the perishable foods in the supermarket as 
compared to the specialty shops, they suspected that the perishables in the 
supermarket were not as fresh, and, research showed, they missed the 
masterful, personalized service and friendliness of the specialist (Exhibits 
14 & 15.) 
Although the percentage of supermarket sales accounted for by fresh 
foods had grown to about 35 percent over recent years (Exhibit 16), van 
Oostveen was determined that the large proportion of total sales of fresh 
4 foods that did not pass through the supermarket represented an enormous 
untapped potential for the Albert Heijn Company (Exhibit 17.)  After all, 
specialty food store sales, in The Netherlands alone, represented a Dfl 14.3 
billion business in 1988 (Exhibit 18.) 
Knowing that he couldn't change consumer attitudes overnight, 
however, van Oostveen came upon what he regarded as a novel approach: 
a compromise between a supermarket and a specialty shop.  He envisioned 
a chain of small to medium sized shops where consumers could buy all 
their fresh food needs at one time, but only their fresh foods, no grocery 
products.  He reasoned that if consumers were going to continue to insist on 
buying their perishable foods at someplace other than a  "supermarket," 
then he would get Ahold into the specialty food business.  Furthermore, he 
felt that the long term trend of specialty store closings had made available 
an untapped pool of "food experts" that might be interested in participating 
in some type of "collective food network" rather than abandon their careers 
completely.  Perhaps franchising should be investigated. 
Since his own background was in dry grocery distribution, van 
Oostveen recognized early in his planning that he needed an individual to 
lead this new initiative with experience in the fresh food business.  Because 
the existing personnel at Albert Heijn were primarily individual 
commodity handlers--that is, either meat alone, cheese alone, produce 
alone, etc.--he felt it important to bring in someone from outside the Albert 
Heijn organization.  Anton Innemee, with a  considerable management 
experience with food manufacturers as well as several prominent food 
service distributors, combined just the right balance Qf skills for the job.  He 
was hired to lead the Fresh Project in October of 1987 at a vice-presidential 
level. 
After several lengthy discussions with van Oostveen regarding the 
basic concept to be followed, Innemee was left on his own to develop the 
project.  He was given free rein to use either Albert Heijn's existing 
resources or to hire and develop his own.  The luxury of this much freedom 
and executive position carried with it a heavy burden:  although a portion of 
the senior management referred to the Fresh Project as a valuable 
"experiment," others felt that the Albert Heijn Co.  ought to stick to what it 
knew best--efficient distribution of high-volume, low-margin dry grocery 
merchandise.  Complete focus on perishables represented a fundamentally 
different business for Albert Heijn.  Innemee was aware that often 
dramatic new business directions required a dismantling of the current 
power structure, a rejection of the old culture and an establishment of all 
new management systems.  But he realized that such a radical 
restructuring was neither possible nor desirable in this case.  At the same 
time he sensed that this was one experiment that must not fizzle in the 
laboratory if his career at Ahold was to flourish. 
In the ensuing months,  Innemee put his team and concept together. 
They made the following decisions:  three different sized formats would be 
's opened, in three different type locations (urban and suburban), and, 
although the basic theme would be fresh foods in all three, the larger the 
size, the more fresh foods would be carried.  Service would be offered in all 
departments.  The design would be distinctive, with a hint of upscale.  Out 
of concern for efficiency, operations would attempt to develop synergies with 
Albert Heijn's other operations to the maximum degree.  The stores would 
take advantage of the excellent cadre of perishables buyers (meat, produce, 
dairy, etc) that already existed at Albert Heijn and, too, would make use of 
Albert Heijn's network of manufacturing facilities (eg. Albro Bakery) 
whenever possible.  Most of Mr. Innemee's immediate subordinates and all 
store level employees would come from Albert Heijn.  After dozens of names 
were considered, "The Fresh Company"  (TFC) was adopted in June 1988 as 
the most appropriate imagery for the concept that Mr. Innemee was about 
to launch. 
In the fall of 1988, the three Fresh Company stores were opened:  a 70 
square meter (700 square feet) store in Amsterdam-Osdorp, a suburb of 
Amsterdam, a 330 square meter (3,300 square feet) store in an outdoor 
consumer mall in Eindhoven, a town of 350,000 in the southern part of The 
Netherlands, and.? 500 square meter (5,000 square feet) store in the heart of 
Amsterdam's business, tourist, and residential shopping area. 
Initial Results 
After the initial excitement typical of most new store openings, the 
three stores settled into a pattern that was to spell trouble for Innemee. 
Customer counts were disappointing.  Sales were not attaining their 
projected levels in any of the stores and, moreover, costs had exceeded 
expectations in each instance as well (Exhibit 19.)  Although gross margins 
exceeded The Netherland's supermarket industry average (Exhibit 20), they 
were still not adequate to cover the higher costs of operation for an "all 
fresh" store.  This situation had to be addressed quickly in order to meet the 
one year breakeven period, already twice as lenient as the standard in the 
supermarket industry, that had been given to Innemee. 
Thus, in an effort to redress the financial picture, Innemee called for 
a consumer study to identify the types of people who were shopping in his 
stores, where they were coming from and where they lived.  There were a 
number of other obvious questions that Innemee knew would be useful but 
he felt that cost and time constraints precluded asking them.  Partial 
results from this initial consumer research, conducted in April, 1989, are 
contained in Exhibit 21.  Although, interesting, Innemee's team concluded 
that the specfic research findings were not likely to be helpful in improving 
the company's profit picture.  At the same time, however, they were 
encouraged by one overall impression that emerged from the study:  an 
incontrovertible consumer affirmation of the fresh store concept. 
6 Despite the many small adjustments which had been made during 
the first nine months of operations, in July 1989 Innemee looked with gloom 
at the most recent reports brought down from MID this morning.  He was 
dismayed to note that his intent to upgrade labor quality in March 
apparently had not been successful (Exhibit 22.)  Sales were still below 
levels necessary to sustain the fresh experiment.  Labor costs had generally 
declined but gross margins were still far below the projections called for in 
the origninal budget and strategic plan (Exhibit 23.)  The situation was 
serious enough that van Oostveen had summoned  Innemee to his office 
that morning to discuss the seriously deteriorating situation.  Innemee 
reacted decisively:  he recommended closing the smallest Amsterdam-
Osdorp store on August 1.  It  was by then clear that the store performance 
could not be turned around.  This action would subsequently permit 
complete emphasis on the two stronger stores that remained. 
Furthermore, as part of the overall management transition at Ahold 
after its long-time president, Mr. Albert Heijn retired on September 1, 1989, 
other more difficult questions were being put forth  regarding the future of 
the Fresh Company.  Although fluent in Dutch due to his Flemish birth 
and upbringing, Pierre Everaert, the new president, was an American.  He 
believed that rapid demonstration of financial health was an absolute 
prerequisite for any new enterprise.  He felt that European standards for 
"long" payback periods were an unnecessary luxury.  Hence, van Oostveen 
requested that, in light of TFC's continued lack of financial improvement, 
Innemee prepare a report enumerating his intended responses to each of 
the major challenges that currently confronted TFC.  These responses 
would constitute, van Oostveen explained, the strategic blueprint for TFC's 
immediate future, and likely last chance. 
Current Challenges 
Innemee began by outlining his thoughts regarding the challenges 
that faced TFC and the progress that had been achieved to date.  His notes 
are below: 
L1  Labor:  This is perhaps the most critical issue from two respects. 
One,  simply finding the right persons to fill the many service positions in 
the store has proved to  be a bigger problem than anticipated.  The 
professional craftsmen required are not attracted to the low salaries of  the 
supermarhet industry and, moreover, do  not seem to feel  that working for a 
supermarhet company carries any career distinction.  Working for  a 
supermarket company is apparently viewed as stijZing the creativity upon 
which many a food specialist prides himself  Second,  related to the first,  is 
the problem of unacceptably high labor costs.  The service orientation that is 
7 essential to differentiate TFC from the conventional supermarket is costing 
dearly.  Thus,  identifying the appropriate store personnel and subsequently 
improving their productivity is a top priority  . 
.1 Positioning:  The target group developed for TFC is all fresh foods 
consumers.  It is,  after all,  TFC's objective to offer the widest variety 
possible of  fresh foods all under one roof  This strategy has the  advantage 
of  appealing to the widest variety of  shoppers;  the target is  not limited in 
scope to one consumer segment only.  One possibility, however,  is that the 
current target casts too  wide a net:  are we confusing our position with too 
many images to too  many people?  We  have worked hard to keep our prices 
in line  . 
.1  Location:  It was evident early on that location was a critical factor. 
We  strived for high-traffic, urban sites for our first stores.  However,  we 
now realize that the exorbitant costs for these highly desirable locations 
may present a higher hurdle that we  had originally calculated.  Whereas, 
for  example, an average Albert Heijn supermarket pays approximately fl 
250 per square meter for real estate costs,  our central Amsterdam store 
pays over fl 650 per square meter.  This adds considerably to our difficulty in 
breaking even  . 
.1 Merchandising:  We  have deliberately sought to create a unique, 
upscale decor and have complemented that uniqueness with an attractive 
variety of fresh food departments.  Service is emphasized.  We  are 
convinced that the in-store preparation "drama" is important to 
communicate our image to shoppers as the experts.in fresh food and food 
preparation.  Although we  are anxious to  attract more shoppers,  we are 
constrained by the so-called "Shops Early Closing Act" which restricts 
retail food stores to  52-hour opening schemes per week,  with a required 
18.00 hour closing regulation.  Although many European countries 
imposed such restrictions on its retail shops,  the situation in The 
Netherlands was believed to be the most severe (Exhibit 24.)  Only outlets 
selling complete meals to  consumers, like restaurants, are currently 
permitted to  remain open longer.  It is clear that there are merchandising 
opportunities for  The Fresh Company outside of these testrictive hours, as 
evidence by the considerable share of Thursday's sales, the one day a week 
where 18.00-21.00 opening hours are allowed, that are conducted after 18.00 
(Exhibit 25).  But thus far Parliament has accepted none of  the many 
alternative proposals for extended hours put to it by the retailers' trade 
association  . 
.1  Product Mix:  TFC began with a full range of  fresh products, some 
supplied by the traditional distribution networh of  Albert Heijn and, when 
this was not feasible,  some were supplied by  independent, external 
suppliers and distributors.  The department planogram and the store 
design were considered to  be unique (Exhibit 26.)  It is tempting to ash how 
the mix and design should now be altered.  Very few of the departmental 
categories are achieving their expected contributions to total sales.  An 
8 exception is the new department / category,  "Fresh Prepared Meals. II  This 
product group consists of various medium priced dishes and meals, 
generally totally prepared for  immediate consumption (with modest 
reheating or microwaving.)  These meals are,  so far,  entirely prepared 
outside the store by small food processors and delivered to the store.  Most of 
the other departments have considerable amounts of food preparation 
activity actually conducted on the store premises.  It is believed that this in-
store "theater, II despite the high rate of  product losses incurred due to the 
small batch processes,  adds immeasurably to the consumer perception of 
freshness.  Another curious observation is that the small dry grocery / wine 
group has very attractive net margins  . 
.1  Promotion' ,'  Although our principal vehicle for  communication 
with the public has been through local newspaper advertising and our own 
colorful bi-weekly newsletter complete with holiday food ideas  and exotic 
recipes, it is not at all clear that our message is getting through.  However, 
television is too expensive  and national newspaper and magazines seem 
inefficient.  Perhaps this is an area to  be examined. 
The 'Turn Around' Plan 
Mr. Innemee read through his notes to himself a second time.  He 
hoped he had not left out anything essential because he knew that his report 
of responses to these challenges would be viewed critically by Messers van 
Oostveen and Ev~raert  both.  He had convoked a meeting tomorrow 
afternoon to discuss the new MID operating results reports and van 
Oostveen's hard reaction to them with his key staff members.  Over the next 
few weeks it would be his task, and that of his staff, to submit an innovative 
plan to Mr. van Oostveen on the future of The Fresh Company. 
9 THE FRESH COMPANY:  A 
TEACmNG NOTE 
CHANGES  MADE TO  TFC  - October  1989 
ASSORTMENT 
According  to  consumer  types: 
•  Living  in  neighborhood:  daily  food  and  more 
complete  mix 
•  Working  in  area:  daily food,  as  well  as  fast and 
more  convenIence  products;  open  later  in 
evenIng 
•  Shoppers  and  tourists:  impulse  and  special  and 
unique,  trendy,  seasonal  items,  upscale 
LABOR 
•  More  self-service 
•  Central  check  stands 
•  Service  merchandising  and  training,  but  .  .  . 
•  Less  in-store  production  -- "just  enough  theatre" OPERATIONS 
•  Improved  inventory  control 
•  Reduce  shrink 
DISTRIBUTION 
•  Specialized  wholesalers,  not  Albert  Heijn  system 
•  Specialized  processors 
PROMOTION 
•  Education  materials  -- rec1pes,  menus,  Fresh 
News 
•  Attention  to  visual  merchandising,  regular  theme 
events,  in-store  demos 
•  Gift  boxes 
•  "Fax Food" 
•  Catering,  party  platters THE FRESH COMPANY:  B 
After  much  debate  and  a  certain  amount  of  agonIzIng 
with  his  management  staff,  Anton  Innemee  decided  to  focus 
his  efforts  and  those  of TFC  on  four  major  areas  of  change. 
He  remained  convinced  that  the  basic  concept  was  correct 
and  believed  that  adjustment  to  these  four  areas  would 
succeed  in  boosting  TFC  irtto  profitability.  In  August  1989, 
Van  Oosteen  approved  the  following  changes,  hoping  that 
Innamee's  enthusiasm  was  warranted: 
1)  COST  CONTROL  -- knowing  that  margin 
improvement  was  needed,  Innemee  felt  that  costs  should  be 
reduced.  Moreover,  a  number  of  inventory  control 
improvements  were  suggested  and  efforts  to  lower 
shrinkage  and  loss  were  to  be  redoubled.  Importantly, 
much  more  self-service  would  be  introduced. 
2)  DIS T RIB UTI 0 N  -- Innemee  concI  uded  that 
employing  Albert  Heijn's  traditional  procurement  and 
distribution  systems  was  undermining  his  uniquely 
different  concept.  The  "efficiency  and  volume"  mentality  of 
the  dry  grocery  channel  worked  at  counter  purposes  to 
what  was  envisioned  for  TFC.  Thus,  he  proposed 
abandoning  distribution  ties  with  AH  entirely  and,  instead, 
uSIng  local  food  processors  and  small  specialized 
distributors. 3)  PRODUCT  MIX -- the  assortment  of goods  was  to 
be  more  closely  coordinated  with  the  three  primary 
shopper  types: 
•  a  more  complete  line  of  daily  food  needs  would  be 
added  for  those  consumers  Ijving  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  ~ f  the  store. 
•  more  convenience  products  would  be  added  for  those 
working  in  the  area. 
•  more  impulse  type  items  and  specialty  or  "fun" 
products  would  need  to  be  carried  to  appeal  to  the 
tourists  and  passing  shoppers. 
4)  RENOV A TION  -- taking  advantage of a  "loophole" 
in  the  Opening  Hours  legislation  that  allowed  late  hours  sale 
of  restaurant  foods,  Innemee  suggested  the  installation  of 
removable  metal  gates  in  TFC  that  would  permit  consumer 
access  only  to  the  prepared  (eg,  "restaurant  quality")  foods 
departments  after  the  ordinary  1800h  closing. 
The  changes  were  put  into  effect  and  the 
physical  renovation  was  completed  in  October  1989. 
Osteen  asked  for  a  new  financial  report  in  six  months. 
mInor 
Van 
In  May  1990,  Innemee  delivered  the  report  below 
comparing  the  TFC  financial  results  before  the  changes  with 
its  current  status: FRESH COMPANY FINANCIAL RESULTS (INDEXES) 
Actual 
Budgeted  First  9  After 
Plan  Months  Repositioning 
Sept.  '88  July  '89  April  '90 
Sales  100.0  79.0  102.5 
Gross  Margin  32.0  24.2  32.0 
Costs: 
Labor  16.0  18.7  17.2 
Misc.  6.0  6.9  6.4 
Rent  5.4  6.9  5.9 
Depr.  4.6  5.8  4.6 
Net  0.0  -14.1  .4 
Van  Oosteen's  reaction  was  predictable.  He 
congratulated  Innemee  on  his  managerial  skill  and 
orchestration  of  an  impressive  turn-around.  But  he 
pointed  to  the  short-run  nature  of  much  of  what  had  been 
accomplished.  The  financial  results  were  in  the  desired 
direction,  perhaps  even  acceptable,  but  hardly  exceptional 
for  a  $10  billion  company.  What  exactly,  he  wanted  to  know, 
was  Innemee  plannng  for  TFC  in  the  long  run? THE FRESH COMPANY:  B 
TEACmNG NOTE 
FRESH COMPANY FINANCIAL RESULTS 
INDEXES 
Budgeted  Actual 
Plan  First 9  After 
Months  Repositioning 
Sept. 88  July '89  April '90  April '91 
Sales  100.0  79.0  102.5  110.0 
Gross  32.0  24.2  32.0  33.3 
Margin 
Costs: 
Labor  16.0  18.7  17.2  15.5 
Miseel.  6.0  6.9  6.4  5.8 
Rent  5.4  6.9  5.9  5.0 
Depree.  4.6  5.8  4.6  4.1 
Net  0.0  -14.1  0.4  2.9 ., 
THE FRESH COMPANY:  B 
TEACHING NOTE 
ALTERNATIVES FOR TFC IN LONG RUN 
•  Increase  pnce  to  Improve  margIns  -- elasticity  studies. 
needed 
•  Shorter  openIng  hours  in  mornIng 
•  Investigate  cheaper  sites  for  expansion 
•  Experiment  with  alternative  shop  size 
•  Franchising  possibilities 
•  Reduce  promotion  but  sharpen  targets  -- direct  mail, 
holiday  gift  boxes,  etc. 
•  Prepare  all  food  outside 
•  More  self-service  --"illusion  of  service" 
•  Off hours  window  sales 
•  Consider  in-store  eating 
•  "FAX food" 
•  Integration  of TFC  lessons  into  Albert  Heijn .. 
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